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ABSTRACT
Congressional oversight of higher education is vital part of the policy process. 
However, a compressive study regarding the relationship between higher education 
oversight and attention has not been conducted. By utilizing McCubbins and Swartz’s 
Police Patrol and Fire Alarm Oversight Dichotomy, this experiment was able to discover 
that a relationship exists between fire alarm oversight and the amount of public attention 
in the higher education policy process.
Congressional hearings in higher education were broken into three sections over a 
58-year period. Each section was divided by major policy punctuations such as the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 and the 1980 elevation of the Department of Education to 
cabinet level. By utilizing a dataset compiled by the Policy Agendas Project, New York 
Times articles along with Congressional Quarterly Almanac Articles were used to 
measure the public’s awareness and attention of higher education policy.
By using a Poisson regression, a statistically significant relationship was 
discovered in all three time periods of the New York Times articles when compared to 
the frequency of fire alarm oversight days per year. This analysis showed that there is a 
relationship between the frequency of fire alarm days that occur each year and the 
amount of New York Times articles that occur, representative of the public’s attention of 
higher education. However, Congressional Quarterly articles were not found to have a 




History has shown that higher education has long been entangled with the many 
forms and levels of government. Even though higher education tends to be thought of as a 
power reserved for the state, the federal government has taken an active role in the policy 
arena of higher education for more than 175 years (Smith, 1923). Back in the days of 
Socrates, many institutions felt and dealt with the outside pressure of many different 
agents. State, federal, religious, and secular powers have been engrained within the 
creation and development of higher education policy and created both positive and 
negative consequences (Lingenfelter, 2004). To explain it more clearly, Lingenfelter 
states that:
In the martyrdom of Socrates, in the suppression of Galileo by the Catholic 
Church, and in far too many less famous cases, we find social and political 
leaders taking wrong-headed, tragic actions against scholars and 
intellectuals. Paradoxically, such events are both a warning about the abuse 
of state power and incontrovertible evidence that higher learning really 
matters (2004, p. 47).
As a society that lives based on the rules of a republic, the decisions of our leaders 
are to mirror the voices and beliefs of the people. This paper aims to clarify the 
overwhelmingly complicated issue of political oversight and the public’s attention.
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Specifically molded within the realms of higher education, this paper focuses on 
investigating whether a relationship exists between public attention and congressional 
attention of higher education.
Without mention of education in the United States Constitution, and against the 
urging of some of our founding fathers, education is primarily a responsibility of state 
and local government. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution stated that powers not 
specifically reserved for the federal government were reserved for the state. Since 
education is not specifically reserved to the federal government through the Constitution, 
the states received and continue to be the primary policy makers of higher education. 
Apart from military institutions (United States Naval Academy, United States Military 
Academy at West Point, etc) the federal government has been removed from the 
sponsorship of colleges and universities of higher education (Gladieux & King, 2005).
However, with no specific guidelines written within the Constitution regarding 
federal involvement of higher education, all three branches of government have been 
involved in shifting amounts of involvement of higher education. The first major 
involvement of the federal government in education was provision of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1785. This provision stated that one square mile in each township was 
reserved for the creation of public schools. In 1802, the federal government first became 
involved in higher education through the creation of the United States Military Academy 
at West Point. Even though West Point was unable to grant collegiate-level degrees until 
authorized by Congress in 1933, it was seen by many as a federal desire to be involved in 
higher education (Babbidge & Rosenzweig, 1962).
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It is important for scholars of the higher education policy process to understand 
the roots of federal involvement in higher education. In order to understand the future of 
higher education and the federal government’s involvement within, one needs to examine 
over 200 years of education policy to see how both the executive and legislative branch 
has been involved in the past.
Statement of Problem
With over 70 million dollars budgeted to the Department of Education for student 
aid, along with over two billion to help “strengthen teaching and learning in colleges” 
(Grants and Contracts), within the education policy domain, it is important to understand 
if a connection exists between fire alarm oversight and public attention and if public 
attention changes and to what extent over major shifts in policy process.
Since the Legislative Reconstruction Act of 1946, one have at our disposal 
mounds of information regarding the work of Congress and its committees. The 
Congressional Research Service has records dating back to hearings held in 1946 that 
have allowed libraries across the United States to house record hearings, minutes, and 
legislative outcomes. However, research into committee oversight and behavior tends to 
be focused more at Intelligence (Aberbach, 1990; Barrett, 2004), Defense (Art, 1985) and 
the Budget (Price, 1982) with less of a focus on education, especially higher education.
Higher education, both within the legislative and executive arena has been 
involved some major shifts in policy over the past 45 years. However, direct examination 
of congressional oversight in relation to higher education remains relatively minimal. A 
letter from David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to the Legislative 
Leadership in 2006, stressed that “many of the federal government’s higher education
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policy tools, designed decades ago, may not be as well suited for an increasingly diverse 
population” (Walker, 2006, p. 29). The letter to Congress continued, stating that 
increased congressional oversight was needed to assess the “efficiency and effectiveness 
of programs designed to promote access to and affordability of postsecondary education” 
(p. 29) in order for the United States to continue to be competitive in the international 
higher education arena (Walker, 2006).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the changes of congressional oversight, 
specifically fire alarm oversight, and the extent of its relationship to public attention. This 
study divides the complete time period from 1946-2004 into three defined periods (1946- 
1964, 1965-1979, 1980-2004). Specifically, this study is looking to examine if attention 
to higher education (measured by the number of New York Times Articles and 
Congressional Quarterly articles) has a relationship to the amount of fire alarm oversight 
as defined by McCubbins and Swartz (1984).
The relationship between congressional oversights of the executive branch is not a 
new issue to scholars (Smith, 1923; Scher, 1963; Ogul, 1976; Aberbach, 1980). In 
addition, the relationship between congressional oversight of higher education, even 
though the Department of Education was not a cabinet level agency until 1979, has also 
not completely escaped attention (Lane & Lefor, 2007). Since the establishment of the 
Office of Education in 1867, the agency has shifted through several different federal 
departments and changed dramatically in both structure and function (Radin & Hawley, 
1988). This project will investigate the relationship between congressional oversight,
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significant punctuations in the policy process, and how attention shifts between each 
punctuation period.
The change of the executive branch’s involvement in higher education through 
the Department of Education, along with the passage of the Higher Education Act of 
1965, has created significant changes in the higher education policy arena. However, 
little research has been conducted to view what changes these punctuations periods might 
have had on the effect that attention brings into the oversight process.
One important aspect of the legislative process that should not be ignored is the 
power of public attention (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Kingdon,
2003). Whether viewing changes in higher education policy through Baumgartner and 
Jones’ (1993) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory or through the lens of incrementalism 
(Jones, True, & Baumgartner, 1997), research on the relationship between higher 
education and congressional oversight can help clarify the complex relationship between 
the executive bureaucracy and the legislative oversight of that branch.
Employees within the bureaucracy along with members of Congress, educators, 
lobbyists, and researchers could all benefit greatly by understanding if there is a 
connection between public attention and major policy punctuations in higher education 
policy. In addition, if there are correlations found, further research could be done to find 
if there is any causality between the two. For example, does an increase in public 
attention demand punctuation in policy? Could the punctuation in policy create an 
increase in the public attention?
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Research Questions
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between congressional 
oversight and attention, separated by significant punctuations in the policy process. Each 
of the two research questions will be broken into three distinct periods separated by two 
major punctuations in the higher education policy arena as seen in Figure 1. First, 1946 
until 1964 will represent the time from the Legislative Reconstruction Act of 1946 (when 
the Congressional Research Service was funded to track committee hearings) right up 
until the passages of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The second period, 1965-1979, 
will be from 1965 until the elevation of the Department of Education to a cabinet level 
agency in 1980. The third and final period will be from 1980 after the opening of the 
Department of Education until 2004.
Figure 1. Periods One through Three by Punctuation Event
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By following in the footsteps of McCubbins and Swartz (1984) and Balia and 
Deering (2001), all of the higher education congressional hearings from 1946 until 2004 
will be coded to determine which hearings were caused by specific, external reasons. By 
coding congressional hearings in relation to the fire alarm and police patrol dichotomy 
created by McCubbins and Swartz using the guidelines of Balia and Deering. By 
distinguishing which congressional committee hearing are externally event driven, I am
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attempting to discover a connection between externally driven congressional hearings and 
punctuations in the policy process.
With fire alarm oversight focused on decentralized and external factors such as 
interest groups or informed groups of people to bring alert congress, what relationship (if 
any) does the New York Times, with a circulation of over 1.1 million papers daily (2007: 
Top 100 subscriptions) have with the amount of fire alarm oversight per year? Second, 
does Congressional Quarterly, whom over 95% of Congressional representatives 
subscribe to, (CQ.com) have a relationship with the amount of fire alarm oversight?
The primary research questions of the study are the following:
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in New York Times 
higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire alarm 
oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in Congressional 
Quarterly higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire 
alarm oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
First, through an analysis of a random sample of New York Times articles from 
1946 until 2004,1 will determine if a connection exists between the amount of externally 
driven congressional events (fire alarms) and public attention measured through New 
York Times higher education articles. Four separate tests for each period, and then one 
test for the whole time frame (1946-2004) to see if there is a significant statistical 
relationship between New York Times articles related to higher education and Fire Alarm 
oversight.
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My hypothesis for the question 1 is as follows:
• Hypothesis la; that a significant relationship exists between the amount of 
New York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the 
amount of days of fire alarm oversight between 1946-2004.
• Hypothesis lb; A significant relationship exists between the amount of New 
York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the amount 
of days of fire alarm oversight between the second policy period of 1965- 
1979.
• Hypothesis lc; A significant relationship exists between the amount of New 
York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the amount 
of days of fire alarm oversight between the third policy period of 1980-2004.
Second, a similar analysis of a random sample of Congressional Quarterly articles 
from 1946 until 2004 I will determine if a connection exists between the amount of 
externally driven congressional events (fire alarms) and public attention measured 
through Congressional Quarterly higher education articles. Four separate tests for each 
period, and then one test for the whole time frame (1946-2004) to see if there is a 
significant statistical relationship overall between Congressional Quarterly articles related 
to higher education and fire alarm oversight.
My hypothesis for the question 2 is as follows:
• Hypothesis 2a; A significant relationship exists between the amount of 
Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education and an increase in 
the amount of days of fire alarm oversight between 1946-2004
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• Hypothesis 2b; A significant relationship exists between the amount of
Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education and an increase in 
the amount of days of fire alarm oversight between the second policy period 
of 1965-1979.
• Hypothesis 2c; A significant relationship exists between the amount of
Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education and an increase in 
the amount of days of fire alarm oversight between the third policy period of 
1980-2004.
Limitations
The primary difficulty with a study of this magnitude is trying to reduce the outside 
factors that play constantly on the decisions of legislators. As with many research 
projects that use Congress and the Executive branch as comparisons, there are several 
outside factors that could play a role. For example, the amount of congressional oversight 
during a congress that is of an opposite party to the president does not play a significant 
role however, factors such as the amount of congressional staff have been found to play a 
role (Smith K. W., 2005). A thorough understanding of congressional oversight literature 
has shown that differing opinions emerge about the reasons for increased oversight 
(Smith K. W., 2005). In order to minimize the effect of the fluctuations, I am attempting 
to compare the same variable over three time periods. However, it would be far reaching 
to assume that one independent variable would be able to account for 100% of the 
variation of fire alarm oversight.
Due to the different causes that can initiate a committee hearing, I am not looking 
for this research to be generalized into other agencies or policy arenas. As a single case
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study, I am hoping to build to theory and to supplement the field of higher education with 
an analysis of how much, if any, public and congressional attention appears to affect 
major higher education between policy punctuations.
Definitions of Terms
Listed below are the definitions of terms used throughout this study.
Administrative agencies refer to governmental units, or departments that tend to 
reside within the executive branch.
Agenda setting is the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, 
and people outside of the government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention to at any given time (Kingdon, 2003).
Bureaucracy and Bureaucrats (members of the bureaucracy) are those members of 
the executive branch who were not elected or appointed to their position. These civilian 
members often work in administrative agencies and departments of the Federal 
Government. The bureaucracy is often referred to as the “fourth branch of government” 
due to its power to interpret and ensure implementation of laws passed by congress 
(Strauss, 1984).
Bounded Rational is the idea that people as a whole intend on being rational, but 
make decision based on limited information, limited resources, and their desire to 
maximize utility
Civil Officers are employees of the federal government, including judges and 
participants in the judicial branch, (excluding military and those in congressional offices).
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members of the President’s cabinet, including the President himself are classified as civil 
officers (Lieberman, 1999).
Congressional Oversight is defined by McCubbins and Swartz (1984) as 
“whether, to what extent, and in what way Congress attempts to detect and remedy 
executive-branch violations of legislative goals” (p. 165).
Congressional Research Service was created by President Wilson in 1914 and 
originally named the Legislative Reference Service. During the 1970 Legislative 
Reconstruction Act, the LRS was renamed Congressional Research Service and expanded 
its authority to provide information on legislative activity and policy analysis (Library of 
Congress).
Congressional Quarterly is a non-partisan news-reporting agency that publishes 
daily. Owned by the Times Publishing Co., Congressional Quarterly is the largest 
publication devoted specifically towards congress and has more than 150 reporters, 
editors and researchers (CQ.com)
Countermobilization is the process in which people, groups of people, or attention 
is mobilized in order to prevent another group that is growing in power to obtain an 
unbalanced amount of control
Filibuster is ability to continue speaking on the floor of the Senate once you have 
been recognized, and is used to halt the legislative process. Filibustering is offered to the 
members of the Senate, as the House of Representatives does not have such a rule.
Focusing Events are sudden events that can generate a lot of publicity to a specific 
public problem or issue. Focusing events can be the cause of policy changes since they 
increase the amount of attention and information to a specific policy (Birkland, 2005).
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) is a non-partisan, independent agency
that works for Congress. The GAO’s (n.d.) mission is to ensure efficiency and 
accountability of the Federal Government. The head of the GAO is the Comptroller 
General who is appointed to a 15-year term by the President.
Incrementalism is the process of policy change that involves slow, methodical, 
and measured changes in policy. This can be caused by many reasons including 
countermobilization and negative feedback (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
Information Costs are the costs, both in human, cognitive and actual capital that 
are required to obtain and understand information.
Muddling-Through. also known as “successive, limited comparisons” is a 
decision model based on limited knowledge and resources is similar to incrementalism in 
that it policy decisions are combinations of gradual steps.
Negative Feedback is a decrease in the amplification of attention to a policy 
agenda. Decreased attention, resources, or countermobilization can cause a policy to 
return to equilibrium prevent a major shift in the policy.
New York Times is a daily newspaper, printed in New York City and published 
internationally. The New York Times is often regarded as the nations “newspaper of 
record” meaning that the newspaper tends to hold very high journalistic standards that 
could be used for the base of scholarly research.
Policy Monopolies are a group of actors who tend to dominate or “monopolize” 
policy making in a specific domain (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
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Positive Feedback is the process in which an item or policy gains attention and 
momentum. This positive feedback amplifies of the original attention or policy instead of 
stabilizing the signal causing the possibility of a policy shift.
Public Congressional Hearings are public information gathering forums held by 
either both houses of Congress with the intent of learning about legislation, performing 
oversight, and to learn about constituent problems.
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory is the theory that political processes are generally 
characterized by stability and incrementalism, however there are occasionally large, or 
dramatic changes from previous policies instead of small, incremental changes.
Nature of the Study
New York Times and Congressional Quarterly articles were analyzed to see if a 
relationship existed between the amount of articles occurring per year and the amount of 
fire alarm oversight hearings by congressional committees. In addition, the committees 
involved in higher education oversight were analyzed to see if a relationship exists 
between the amount of committees that participate in higher education oversight each 
year and the amount of fire alarms that occur. A list of 558 committee hearings related to 
higher education were coded using the guidelines by Balia and Deering (2001) to 
determine if whether a hearing was a police patrol or fire alarm by the definitions of 
McCubbins and Swartz (1984).
Data from the New York Times articles, Congressional Quarterly articles and 
Congressional committee counts were analyzed using STATA (Data Analysis and 
Statistics Software) using regression analysis. After the completion of OLS Regression 
analysis (Ordinary Least Squares Regression), a non-linear distribution resulted, which
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lead to the use of a Poisson regression analysis. By the use of a Poisson regression 
analysis, a determination if a relationship between each dependant variable (New York 
Times articles, Congressional Quarterly articles, and Congressional Committee 




In order to understand the effect that congressional committee hearings and the 
media have on the agenda setting and policy process it is important to first start with a 
general understanding of how policy change and the major actors involved in higher 
education policy. This literature review contextualizes and studies the relationship 
between congressional oversight and significant punctuations in the policy process. In 
order to understand the relationship between oversight and punctuations, I will first 
examine preeminent models of policy change from punctuated equilibrium theory in 
order to gain a solid understanding of how policies change, the actors involved, and what 
causes major changes, or punctuations, in policy.
Second, with the focus of the thesis based on legislative oversight, it is important to 
take a close look at the evolution of both the executive branch and the legislative branch 
that performs oversight over it. The second part of the literature review will cover the 
evolution and involvement of the Executive branch and most importantly the Department 
of Education from its establishment in 1867, until its elevation to a cabinet level agency 
in 1980.
Third, returning to the realm of the legislature, it is important to start with a solid 
understanding of congressional oversight, the actors involved, how it has changed over 
the past 60 years and also what effect external factors such as the media play on the
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oversight process. Once we has the opportunity to understand congressional committees 
and congressional hearings, I will cover an oversight hybrid form created by McCubbins 
and Swartz (1984) known as Police Patrol and Fire Alarms. The final part of the chapter 
will connect all of the pieces of this puzzle by noting connections between the 
intertwined world of agenda setting, public attention, and legislative oversight.
Punctuated Equilibrium
There have been many different attempts to discover a solid explanation of how 
policies evolve so that we may increase our understanding and possibly even learn how to 
control the process. Research has been devoted to a variety of policy making processes, 
such as “incrementalism” (True, 2000; Kingdon, 2003; Davis, Dempster, & Wildavsky, 
1966) and “punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Jones, Sulkin, &
Larsen, 2002)” and including hybrid models such as “muddling through” (Lindblom, 
1959; Gregory, 1989) in hopes of finding an explanation.
However, it is important to note that due to the complexity of the policy creation 
process, only a small aspect of the process will be looked at throughout the study. 
Kingdon (2003) looks at the development of the policy process and the agenda-setting 
aspect in two different lights. According to Kingdon, it is worth separating the two and 
considering them individually because “[djevolopment in the policy stream might well 
resemble the long process of natural selection... [b]ut the agenda-setting process might 
be must less gradualistic” (2003, p. 226). For this reason, reference to the policy process 
and agenda setting will be interchangeable, with no focus on the developmental aspect of 
the policy stage. For the purpose of this thesis, we will use the definition of agenda 
setting as defined by Kingdon. He states that agenda setting is “the list of subjects or
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problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of the government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” 
(2003, p. 3).
Punctuated Equilibrium theory was originally adapted from research by Eldredge 
and Gould in 1972 in relation to evolution of biological species. Based on the 
evolutionary work of Darwin, Eldredge and Gould learned that the evolution of species 
was not a consistent and perfectly incremental process. By viewing the changes of 
species, Eldredge and Gould noticed that due to the surroundings, species would go from 
periods of rapid change to periods of relative stasis. Similar to the evolution of biological 
species, Baumgartner and Jones realized that policy did not evolve at a perfectly 
incremental rate and punctuated equilibrium theory for policy was bom (Mulholland & 
Shakespeare, 2005).
Baumgartner and Jones noticed that politics imitated biology in that it also had 
periods of relative stasis sometimes followed by rapid often very dramatic changes in 
policies. True, Jones and Baumgartner (2007) state that:
Punctuated Equilibrium theory seeks to explain a simple observation:
Political processes are generally characterized by stability and 
incrementalism, but occasionally they produce large-scale departures from 
the past. Stasis, rather than crisis typically characterizes most policy areas, 
but crises do occur (p. 155).
As agendas change, information flows shift, and policy monopolies fall, new windows 
are open in the policy area that creates the possibility for larger scale change 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
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Jones, Sulkin & Larsen (2002), explained the Punctuated Equilibrium theory in 
relation to tectonic plate movement on the earth. Daily, small earthquakes constantly 
cause the crust of the earth to move, sometimes without people even noticing. However, 
as each of the small earthquakes (inputs) releases some of the pressure on the crust, not 
all the pressure is able to be released (output) and eventually a larger earthquake occurs 
releasing the pressure from all previous shifts (inputs). They argue the policy creation 
process works in the same way -  with constant little changes (incrementalism) that add 
up into larger policy punctuations when in the words of Kingdon (2003), a policy 
window opens or in the words of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), positive feedback is 
occurring. First, in order to understand what causes punctuations in the policy 
equilibrium we need to understand the factors that inhibit or create change.
Policy monopolies are a major contributor to punctuated equilibriums and have a 
very important effect on the policy agenda. As policy monopolies are created and 
destroyed, they restrict and allow access into the legislative process. As a policy group 
becomes more powerful, opposing groups often attempt to increase their power to keep 
the policy process in check. It is in the best interest of those supporting a policy 
monopoly to ensure that the policy system remains as closed as possible. Through 
limiting information to those outside of the monopoly and by using the mass media to 
express their claims, policy monopolies can remain successful (at least for a period of 
time) in isolating the policy decision process (Birkland, 2005). If an opposing policy 
group grows at a similar rate as their counterpart, incrementalism ensues -  however, if 
one group is able to garnish more resources then their counterpart -  or if they grow
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unopposed, positive feedback can result, creating the possibility of larger policy 
punctuations (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
Based on the premise of positive and negative feedback, Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) argue that slow and incremental change is caused by negative feedback within the 
agenda setting aspect of the policy stage. Negative feedback causes the system to 
decrease in important and salience, whereas positive feedback augments disturbances 
causing them to become noticeable and “major disruptions as they operate across time” 
(1993, p. 6). A work by True, Jones and Baumgartner (2007) views positive feedback as 
a “feeding frenzy and bandwagon effect” (p. 160) and compares negative feedback as a 
thermostat that keeps the room at a constant temperature, making sure it does not become 
too warm or too cold.
In addition to negative and positive feedback, scholars have identified several 
complementing and sometimes overlapping forces on the policy agenda that have both 
impeding and assisting effects on changes within policy such as finite information and 
policy monopolies and their effect on the legislative process. In addition to the media and 
interest groups, the basics of the legislative process tend to have an incremental effect on 
the legislative process. One of the ideas expressed, which is believed to contribute to a 
punctuated equilibrium, is the act of the legislative process itself. By legislators 
reauthorizing prior legislation and basing new budgets off of prior budgets (Davis, 
Dempster, & Wildavsky, 1966), the legislative process itself is ensuring and 
institutionalizing minor and incremental changes in policy. In addition, if decision 
makers create and enact small, incremental changes, if a policy problem occurs it is easier
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to correct the issue as opposed to trying to reverse a major new policy process 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
With the fundamentals of democracy promoting the freedom of speech and 
association, mobilization and counter mobilization tend to keep the policy agenda in a 
relative equilibrium. As legislators, lobbyists, and political actors influence the policy 
agenda, groups who hold a different view and organized interests mobilize to keep the 
policy in check. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the “political system at 
balance is quite conservative, since it implies that dramatic changes from the status quo 
are unlikely” (p. 10). Typically, the new members into the policy area are the biggest 
advocates for changing the status quo. As new actors become involved, they are able to 
uproot the traditional boundaries that prevent collaboration between different 
governmental actors and allow policies to be changed (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 
2007).
Next, the idea of finite information is another important contributor to punctuations 
in the policy process. The policy area is very complex with actors both inside and outside 
of the government, relying on information that can is often hard to obtain. There is a cost 
to obtain information, which further compounds the issue -  limited information and 
limited budgets can make for limited knowledge when making policy decisions. (True, 
Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). Focusing events, crises, and an accumulation of problems 
over a period of time have caused attention to be raised on specific policies where little 
(if any) attention was focused on earlier (Kingdon, 2003). Another aspect of information 
is information salience. Policies have a way of grabbing attention one day, and then 
fading from the limelight the very next. Problems that were unnoticed only weeks or
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months before now have the attention of the media and those who consume it. As such,
focusing events and crises tend to place previously ignored problems front-and-center on 
the schedules of public officials creating an opportunity for the correctly situated, 
strategically positioned, or lucky interest group, lobbyist or legislator to act and shift the 
policy equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen break down the cost of information even further -  into 
information costs and cognitive costs. With finite budgets, the costs of retrieving 
information relevant to the policy agenda can be limited. In addition, cognitive costs are 
the costs associated with the interpretation and ability of the people to process that 
information. Both the information costs and the cognitive costs create friction in the 
policy process (2002). If one has access to large pools of information for a low cost along 
with people who are able to interpret that information efficiently, that could cause a 
dramatic shift in policies as opposed to an organization with very stringent resources. The 
idea of bounded rationality that tends to create an incremental policy process also helps 
facilitate policy punctuations. Jones (2001) argues that the cognitive and information 
limits that are placed on the decision makers are one major reason that policy 
punctuations occur.
Recent research conducted by Wood (2006) as points out two very important 
implications about punctuations relevant to this thesis. First, just because there is no 
punctuation identified in the policy stream it does not mean that there is not a conflict. 
Conflict can occur without major punctuations in the policy cycle. Second, positive 
feedback can be resisted by opponents of change by legislative actors and by legislative 
tools such as the filibuster. Even after powerful political actors such as the President or a
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majority party or a policy monopoly take hold, there still are tools that can prevent or 
slow punctuations.
Executive Involvement in Higher Education
With over 4,500 employees and a budget of 71.5 million dollars1, the Department of 
Education has come a long way from its founding over 175 years ago. The Department of 
Education, even though only existing as a cabinet level organization within the executive 
branch since 1980, has been in the works since 1840 (Smith D. H., 1923).
Henry Bernard was able to convince the U.S. Bureau of Census to retrieve data 
related to education in 1840 that included literacy rates and the amount of schools and 
colleges operating in America. Prior to the Census Bureau’s work, there were no 
centralized information and educational standards varied widely from school to school 
(Kursh, 1965).
In 1846, Congress created the Smithsonian Institute that brought national attention 
to education because of the Smithsonian’s involvement in scientific research. Riding on 
the momentum and enthusiasm of scientific discovery, Barnard and his colleagues 
attempted to create a proposal for a federal agency (Kursh, 1965). The Smithsonian was 
not the only proposed home for a new agency to work with education. In 1851 and 1854, 
Congress discussed the idea for a creation of a separate Department of Education and in 
addition, in 1849 they had discussions to create a statistical bureau that would be retrieve 
and analysis education data. It was not until 1854 that with the help of the Association for 
the Advancement of Education that a plan was created outlining the Department of 
Education (Smith, 1923).
1 Based on the 2007 estimate from the Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/
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The notion that government should not be involved in education was shattered by 
the 1862 Morrill Act, and pressure again rose for the creation of a federal agency for 
education. In 1867, while rebuilding from the Civil War, Congress appropriated $13,000 
dollars to create a central agency for education. This bill, introduced by Representative 
Garfield from Ohio (later President Garfield) established a Federal Department of 
Education (Smith, 1923)
Over 30 years after Henry Barnard first asked the Census to gather data about 
education in the United States, he was appointed the first Commissioner of Education. 
Fearing an increase in federal presence in education beyond the collection and 
distribution of statistics, Congress renamed the newly created Department of Education to 
Office of Education and placed the agency within the Interior Department. Barnard, as 
Commissioner of Education, was to report to the Interior Secretary and education 
remained without cabinet representation. In 1870, the name changed a third time to the 
“Bureau of Education” although it remained within the interior department. The Bureau 
of Education, once again, returned to the name of the Department of Education in 1929 
(Kursh, 1965).
The Office of Education was removed from the Department of the Interior and 
placed within the Federal Security Agency after its creation in 1930. In 1953, the Federal 
Security Agency was changed to Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 
After the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill) and other 
legislation in the early 1950s, the Office of Education grew rapidly, expanding to over 
1,100 employees in 1960 (Sniegoski, 1988).
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Once again, the National Education Association would play a large role in the 
creation of policy by urging President Jimmy Carter towards the creation of a cabinet 
level agency for education. (Sniegoski, 1988). After more than 130 pieces of legislation 
were introduced to Congress between 1908 and 1975 (with 48 of the bills between 1965 
and 1975), attention for the desire to create a Department of Education was becoming 
more obvious (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
President Carter signed the legislation for the creation of the Department of 
Education (“ED,” not to be confused with DOE which is the Department of Energy) into 
law on October 17, 1979. The newly created Department of Education had its funds 
authorized by the 96lh Congress and officially opened its doors on May 4, 1980 
(Sniegoski, 1988).
Legislative Involvement in Higher Education
Similar to the Executive branch, the legislative branch became involved in higher 
education soon after the inception of the United States. In 1802, “An Act Fixing the 
Military Peace Establishment of the United States” by the legislature allowed funding for 
the creation of United States Military Academy at West Point. However, legislative 
activities tended to be mostly focused around the admission of new states into the union 
and the provisions of higher education that were contained within them (Babbidge & 
Rosenzweig, 1962).
The Morrill Act, the one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation for higher 
education, was introduced to Congress in 1857 and passed through both houses two years 
later in 1859. President Buchanan vetoed the original Act, feeling that it allowed too 
much federal involvement in education. The role of the federal government would soon
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take a dramatic pause with the start of the Civil War in 1861. Even with a war separating 
the nation, the Morrill Act of 1862 once again was passed by Congress and signed by 
President Lincoln on July 2, 1862 (Kursh, 1965). However, Congress’s role in higher 
education is more than creation of legislation, accountability to an overgrowing executive 
bureaucracy is an increasingly important function (Aberbach, 1980; Mayhew, 1991; 
Kingdon, 2003)
This study focuses on two recent pieces of legislation passed by Congress to serve 
as punctuations between periods of higher education policy: the elevation of the 
Department of Education, and the passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act.
C on gression a l C om m ittee as an O versigh t M echanism
The congressional committee hearing or “public hearing” is an important tool that 
the legislative body utilizes during the oversight process. The House of Representative 
and the Senate have the ability to collect information in order to address issues brought 
by constituents, interest groups, and other political actors. In order to hold administrative 
agencies accountable to the people, congressional committees are able to conduct 
oversight of those who were appointed by the executive branch. Davidson and Oleszek 
(2006) also stated that hearings are “valuable devices for making government 
accountable to the people. They can spawn new laws or their functional equivalent: 
unwritten laws that change bureaucratic operations” (p. 355).
Scholars have used the amount of committee hearing activity as a barometer for 
congressional oversight activity for over 75 years (Galloway, 1927; Scher, 1963; Ogul M. 
S., 1976; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Balia & Deering, 2001). By measuring the 
amount of oversight hearings, scholars can receive a vague idea of how much oversight
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Congress is exerting over the executive branch. In addition, since the Legislative 
Reconstruction Act of 1946, increased funding to Congressional Research Service has 
provided a great insight into the works of congressional committees by keeping records 
of individual committee hearings. With added information about each individual hearing, 
scholars are now able to make a crude measure of how important each hearing is by 
weighting each hearing by the amount of days that a hearing lasted. Following in the idea 
of McCubbins and Swartz (1984), finite resources and tight budgets lead members of 
Congress to prefer oversight activities that will bring the most benefit to their positions, 
and thus, less important hearings can assumed to be kept shorter in duration.
Evolution o f  C on gression a l C om m ittee O rgan iza tion
Congressional committees were created during the convening of the first congress 
in 1789. The standing committee was created in the House of Representatives and based 
on past legislatures like the Continental Congress and British House of Commons 
(Davidson & Oleszek, 2006). According to the United States Senate Historical Office 
(n.d.), Senate Committees operate as fact-finding panels that are also used to create 
policy and help build consensus in legislation. Although many are almost as old as the 
Senate itself, senators periodically update their jurisdictions and resources to meet the 
evolving demands of modern American life.
The Legislative Reconstruction Act of 1946 formally established the roles of 
congressional committees in the oversight process. It charged Congress with “cautious 
watchfulness” of the executive agencies and had an increased focus on committee 
efficiently and effectiveness (Rosen, 1989). Through the reduction of the number of 
congressional committees in each chamber and by making jurisdictional boundaries more
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specific along with the addition extra staff, congressional committees were better 
prepared to go up against the growing executive branch. However, many feel one of the 
important aspects of the Legislative Reconstruction Act of 1946 is that it formally, for the 
first time, mentioned congressional oversight and the legislatures role of oversight in the 
committees (Aberbach, 1990).
In 1970, amendments to the 1946 Legislative Reconstruction Act again put the 
committee structure under the knife. The 1970 amendments increased role of the 
Congressional Research Service to expand their involvement and the information that it 
could gather. In addition, the amendments strengthened the General Accountability 
Office’s (GAO) ability to complete program evaluation and most relevant to this thesis, 
explicated to congress the intent to “review and study, on a continuing basis, the 
application, administration and execution” of all laws that are under the purview each 
committee (Kaiser, 1997).
Through their research, many scholars have agreed that Congress acts either 
proactive or reactive, but have tried to further distinguish oversight into manifest or latent 
forms (Ogul, 1976), adversarial or advocatory (Aberbach, 1990), formal and informal 
(LaFollette, 1994), and in addition, the focus of this thesis, police patrol and fire alarm 
oversight (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Prior to the work by McCubbins and Swartz 
(1984), scholars characterized congressional oversight as lacking, overly complex, and in 
many cases non-existent. However, McCubbins and Swartz (1984) disagreed and stated 
that congress does have an active involvement in oversight, but that they have a 
preference for fire-alarm oversight as opposed to police-patrol oversight. 2
2 See Ogul 1976; Aberbach 1990
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Legislative Oversight
Legislative oversight, known most basically as the review of the activities of the 
bureaucracy and executive branch by the legislative branches, has been seen in many 
different forms since it was first used over 215 years ago. The Senate and the House of 
Representatives have both been involved in congressional oversight not long after the 
ratification of the Constitution on June 21, 1788 with investigation of the War 
Department in 1790 (Smith, 2005). According to Galloway (1927), congressional 
committees have three basic functions: to aid in the creation of legislation, to supervise 
the executive branch, and to inform public opinion. This section of the literature review 
will focus on the evolution of the second function of congressional committees, to 
supervise the executive branch or administration, by reviewing several pieces of literature 
that have looked intensely in the role of congressional committees within the “oversight 
process.”
It is important to note that the supervision of executive agencies is not an 
enumerated power. There is no direct mention of oversight in the Constitution; however, 
its existence has been implied since the ratification of the Constitution. The Constitution 
enumerated several powers to the legislative branch that require knowledge of the 
executive agencies to ensure that the agencies were acting in accordance to what the 
legislature had intended. In order for congress to raise and support an army, declare war, 
appropriate funds, and remove civil officers (by impeachment) it must understand how 
the agencies are working, the cost they are incurring, who is administering the programs
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and most importantly whether or not they are they operating within the intent of the 
legislation (Legislative - Executive Relations — Congressional Oversight, 1993).
There is not a universally accepted definition of what precisely congressional or 
legislative oversight is. For example, Aberbach (1990) defines oversight as the “review of 
actions of federal departments... including the review that takes place during program and 
policy implementation as well as afterward” (p. 2) while Ogul views oversight as 
“behavior by legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively, which results in an 
impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior” (1976, p. 11). For purpose of this 
study, I will use McCubbins and Swartz (1984) view of oversight. They define oversight 
as “whether, to what extent, and in what way Congress attempted to detect and remedy 
executive-branch violations of legislative goals” (p. 165). This definition will be relevant 
to this area of study because it takes into consideration the outside forces that play on 
oversight that will be examined through this analysis.
Is A m ount o f  O versigh t bein g  O verlooked?
Legislative oversight often comes under attack for being absent or lacking 
(Aberbach, 1980), however, congressional hearings and investigations have been 
increasing since the 1960s for a multitude of reasons. According to Scher (1963), there 
are seven main reasons that even though congressional oversight exists it is often not 
noticed or largely publicized. These seven reasons can be broken into two main 
categories - four reasons concerning oversight costs and rewards and three reasons 
concerning relationships. Legislators have to weigh the costs and benefits of 
congressional oversight of committees. The cost versus rewards can be summarized up 
to four reasons. First, legislators must seek the greatest reward for their legislative
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behavior. Second, agencies are seen as “impenetrable mazes” (p. 532) with only the most 
experienced legislators being able to reap the rewards of trying to “penetrate” the 
bureaucracy. Third, committees will only seek to investigate an agency if they do not 
expect costly retaliation. Fourth, unless there are persuasive reasons to use committee 
resources for oversight they will continue along a fixed routine with little oversight.
However, relationships between the legislators and the President and agency heads 
also play a role in congressional oversight. Seller’s three relationship reasons can be 
summarized as such. First, legislators who have established rewarding relationships with 
agency heads are less likely to disturb that relationship and perform oversight of their 
agency. Second, legislators often feel that the relationships that they have developed with 
agency actors could serve more valuable for constituent needs. Finally, if a Member of 
Congress views they can receive a reward by close ties with the President they will be 
less willing to examine the agencies and agency officials whom are appointed by the 
President (1963). Each of the seven reasons listed by Scher may cause, individually or in 
a combination of, decreased focus or less public attention on congressional oversight.
As research has been increasing in the field of congressional or legislative 
oversight, a few scholars argue that there has been a dramatic increase in oversight over 
the last 30 years. Through the congressional reconstruction in 1946 and the amendments 
offered in 1970, oversight has not only been more explicitly expected, but also made 
more efficient through increased committee staff, more funding for the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and also greater evaluation from the GAO. Increased committee 
staff along with increased funding for CRS has allowed more information to be collected
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and distributed to the public. In addition, the GAO received increased funding and 
opportunity to evaluate programs and policies created by the legislative branch.
Birkland (2005) offers three main reasons to explain the increase in Congressional 
oversight activity from 1970. First, due to the increasing complexity of the laws that are 
passed by congress, it is important that agencies follow the legislative intent of the law. 
The executive branch and the agencies are allowed discretion in how the law is executed 
and are able to emphasize parts of laws while putting little-to-no emphasis on other parts 
of the law. Congress may hold hearings or conduct investigations to ensure that the laws 
are being executed in the way they had intended and if not, they are able to create new 
legislation, amend the laws to more adequately serve their intent, or apply pressure, 
budgetary or otherwise to remedy the differences in legislative intent (2005).
Second, Birkland argues that there has been increased pressure over the last 20 
years to ensure that current laws are amended and updated as opposed to writing 
completely new laws. Congressional oversight is needed to ensure that current laws are 
being upheld properly and to learn how to strengthen the current laws. Similar to the first 
reason, as laws grow in complexity and with a finite amount of resources and staff, it is 
important that the legislative process is used to amend laws if possible.
The third reason listed by Birkland is the most controversial of the three reasons 
listed. Birkland states that:
Greater partisan polarization in Congress -  in particular, the shift in power 
in the Congress from Democrats to Republics -  has made oversight an 
important way for Republicans to scrutinize programs that are less popular 
with their partisan than with more liberal democrats (p. 222).
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Birkland, however, is not the only scholar who believes that the partisan divide has 
caused increased oversight. Scher (1963) argued almost 40 years prior that when the 
leadership of an opposing party feels that they would be able to cause a large amount of 
embarrassment for the opposing party or an opposition president that oversight of their 
policies would increase.
Research completed by Aberbach (1990) found that an increase of oversight by 
26% occurred during times of divided government as opposed to periods of time when 
both the executive and legislative branch were under the same party control. Ten years 
prior to the completion of that research, Aberbach (1980) stated an idea similar to Scher 
that if two different parties control the executive and legislative branches there is an 
increase in the amount of oversight in the hopes of embarrassing or harassing the 
opposing party.
It is important to note however, that research by Mayhew (1991) found no 
significant increases or decreases in the amount of investigations that either party held 
during opposition or same-party congresses (however his oversight literature consisted 
only of 31 investigations throughout 44 years). In addition to the findings by Mayhew, 
Smith (2005) also finds that periods of unified or divided government do not have 
statistical relevance on explaining the increase in congressional oversight. Smith (2005) 
states that “all other things held constant, periods when the House is controlled by one 
party and the presidency another result in no addition oversight hearings” (p. 84).
In conclusion, although scholars differ on the reasoning behind the increase in 
congressional oversight, most authors agree that oversight has increased quite
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dramatically over the past 40 years.3 In the words of Aberbach (1990) “Congress was 
responding to the demands of citizens frustrated by government growth and 
complexity...these changes, and the changes connected to them, worked together to 
increase the payoffs of oversight” (p. 191).
T ypes o f  C on gression a l O versigh t
According to Galloway, in order for Congress to effectively execute their role as 
lawmakers, a house of Congress “may employ any means necessary in its judgment to the 
execution” (1927, p. 54) of the process. With the power to conduct oversight, Congress 
has employed the use of Congressional inquiries that “watches, studies, corrects, and 
perfects our administrative departments” and “reveals inefficiency and dishonesty -  
serious evils which cannot be exposed in any other way (Galloway, 1927, p. 62).
It is very important to differentiate between parameters in which congressional 
oversight is going to be viewed within this thesis. Smith lists the four separate 
dimensions of congressional oversight as: manifest vs. latent, formal vs. informal, 
centralized vs. decentralized, and active vs. passive (Smith, 2005). McCubbins and 
Swartz (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984) outlined a hybrid form of categorizing 
congressional oversight, which they termed “Police Patrol”, and “Fire Alarm” oversight. 
This form of oversight, dubbed “the most influential distinction among forms of 
oversight” (p. 5) by Balia and Deering (2001) is derived from a combination of manifest 
& latent, formal & informal, and active & passive dimensions of oversight; these will be 
discussed more in detail later in this chapter.
M anifest o r  la ten t fo rm  -  Manifest and latent forms of oversight have been covered 
quite in-depth by scholars of legislative oversight. Ogul (1976) originally coined the
3 See Aberbach 1990; Birkland 2005; Rosen 1989; Smith 2005
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terms of manifest and latent oversight in 1976, however later an article by Ogul and 
Rockman (1990) stated that when Ogul distinguished between manifest and latent
Table 1: Rockman’s Alternative Models of Oversight___________________________
Latent Oversight____________ Manifest Oversight___________
Almost Always Particularistic Sometimes Universalized Policy 
and Narrow Remedies Objectives
Nearly Always Stimulus Sometimes Self-Automating
Provoked
Approach: Nearly Always Inductive Sometimes Deductive
XT  ̂ r T . Almost Always At least Subsystemic;Nature of Inquiry: T ,. . ,__________  Individualistic_________________ May be, if rarely, Systemic
Source: Rockman (1984)
oversight “he meant respectively, formal and informal efforts to bring agencies into 
compliance with congressional demands” (p. 6). Rockman (1984) differentiated between 
manifest and latent oversight in four main categories. Table 1 shows the relationship 
between scope, trigger, approach and nature of the inquiries separated by manifest and 
latent oversight.
Rockman (1984) differentiates between latent and manifest oversight further taking 
into consideration what caused the oversight and whom it will affect. One important 
distinction to notice is Rockman’s definition of latent oversight is that latent oversight is 
stimulus provoked, whereas manifest oversight is generally “self-automating” (Rockman, 
1984). Smith (2005) explains manifest oversight as “behavior primarily intended to learn 
about or alter agency behavior” (p. 10) fitting appropriately into Rockman’s alternative 
modes of oversight. Activities such as committee oversight hearings, investigations, and 
concerns heard from constituents would be considered manifest. Manifest oversight, by 
definition, will be comprised entirely of responses to issues because it involves the 
review of programs and agencies. In contrast, latent oversight, is oversight that was not 




However, latent oversight can be both pro-active and re-active, responding to concerns of 
an upcoming crisis and in response to a crisis that has occurred (Ogul & Rockman, 1990). 
Difficulties arise when studying latent oversight because of how broad the interpretation 
of latent oversight can be. Aberbach (1990) decided against using the manifest and latent 
dimension of oversight during his study “Keeping a Watchful Eye”, because the 
definition of latent oversight was so broad that it appeared almost all congressional 
activities could be included within the definition.
F orm al o r  Inform al -  A second dimension of oversight is separated by formal and 
informal oversight. Formal oversight is considered use of the formal mechanisms 
afforded to congress such as committee hearings and constituent services. Research by 
Johannes (1979) found that a large majority of administrative problems were discovered 
through their constituents. This formal process of constituent contact is similar to the 
formal process of holding a committee hearing. Both constituent contacts and hearing 
activities create a record and is formal process by congress. However, informal processes 
are also afforded to the legislature. For example, Scher (1963) explained that members of 
Congress might be unwilling to conduct oversight because of close personal ties to those 
within administrative agencies. These relationships with administrators may also help the 
oversight process by serving as an informal communication line. Other forms of informal 
oversight include communication between committee staff and informal conversations 
with constituents and other political actors.
C en tra lized  o r  d ecen tra lized  -  A third dimension of oversight is whether or not the 
oversight is centralized or decentralized. Almost all congressional oversight is 
decentralized and takes place in the committees. However, Ogul and Rockman (1990)
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point out that the Iran/Contra hearings occurred as a centralized investigation that 
involved the chamber as a whole. McCubbins and Swartz (1984) based their Police- 
Patrol and Fire Alarm model on the idea of centralized oversight within the congress 
(police patrols), and decentralized fire alarms brought to the attention of a centralized 
body by outside individuals and interest groups.
Smith points out another important consideration of centralized oversight -  the 
more centralized the oversight becomes, the greater the chance that congressional leaders 
will have to become involved. In order for an impeachment proceeding to occur, the 
congressional leaders would have to schedule a floor debate and possibly even a vote. 
This type of oversight is more capital intensive then decentralized oversight because 
decreased centralized oversight would require only the attention of committee or 
subcommittee chairs. At the most decentralized level, committee staff act on their own to 
review and investigate the activities of administrative agencies.
A ctive  o r  P assive  -  The fourth and final dimension listed by Smith (2005) is active 
or passive oversight. Active and passive oversight are quite explanatory in their titles -  
active oversight is a proactive search for wrongdoing and malfeasance, whereas passive 
oversight is oversight that occurs along the way of the legislative process. Examples of 
active oversight would be the scheduling of a committee hearing to investigate if an 
administrative agency is following the “legislative intent” of the law or planned contact 
with constituents to learn about programs with an agency. Passive oversight, however, 
refers to oversight that occurs throughout the course of the normal legislative process. 
This oversight might occur through a constituent contacting a member of Congress to
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alert them of a problem or by interest groups or lobbyists that express their concern (Ogul 
& Rockman, 1990).
Using a combination of several dimensions of oversight, McCubbins and Swartz 
(1984) argue that there is a hybrid dimension of oversight, that when overlooked, makes 
Congress appear that they are not conducting oversight as often as they are. McCubbins 
and Swartz argue that members of Congress do not ignore oversight; they just have a 
preference of oversight that does not fit neatly into the four prior dimensions previously 
listed. McCubbins and Swartz created the police patrol and fire alarm model of oversight 
that is the basis for the coding of congressional hearings in this thesis.
Police Patrol and Fire Alarm Forms of Oversight 
McCubbins and Swartz (1984) first argued over 20 years ago that oversight was not 
ignored by congressional actors, but rather that those actors choose one type of oversight 
over another. They speculated that instead of using manifest versus latent or informal 
versus formal oversight that congressional representatives really prefer “fire-alarm” to 
“police-patrol” oversight. Police-patrol oversight is defined by McCubbins and Swartz 
as:
Centralized, active, and direct: at its own initiative, Congress examines a 
sample of executive agency activities, with the aim of detecting and 
remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its own surveillance, 
discouraging such violations. (1984, p. 166)
In contrast to police-patrol oversight, McCubbins and Swartz believe that the Congress 
prefers fire-alarm oversight:
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Less centralized and involves less active and direct intervention that
police-patrol oversight; instead of examining a sample of administrative 
decisions, looking for violations of legislative goals, Congress establishes 
a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual 
citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions 
(1984, p. 166).
Fire alarm oversight, also allows the most benefit for the amount of work exerted. By 
having outside constituencies such as interest groups and individual citizens monitor the 
work of the executive agencies and inform Congress of any wrongdoing, Congress is able 
to address the issue with little to no resources expending on locating problems.
The important distinction between police-patrol and fire alarm congressional 
oversight is that police-patrol oversight is regulation and observation by a congressional 
actor (either a member of Congress or a committee) whereas the source of the 
information for a fire alarm is an outside constituency such as interest group, lobbyist or 
the media (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Balia and Deering (2001) explain that police 
patrol oversight can be an inefficient use of resources because often Congress is 
investigating or tracking agency actions that are within the parameters of the 
congressional intent. Lupia and McCubbins (1994) agree, stating that police-patrol 
oversight is an excellent way to track agency activity, but the increased costs of having to 
conduct the research will lead congressional actors to instead seek out fire alarms because 
they are able to become more involved in the policy issue and bring attention to their 
constituencies without the large resource costs.
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Twenty years after Scher described agencies as “impenetrable mazes” (p. 532), 
Lupia and McCubbins (1994) argue that a police patrol only oversight system would not 
be able to be conducted in short enough time due to fiscal, cognitive and human 
constraints that can be discovered through fire-alarm oversight. Due to finite resources, 
complex forms of oversight are generally avoided in order to ration resources to the most 
at-demand tasks. In the words of Rosenthal (1981), “oversight seems an unfathomable 
business, and not at all convenient to pursue” (p. 121). This idea plays in accordance to 
McCubbins and Swartz, who argued preference of fire alarms over police patrols. By 
having an outside actor bring attention to the administrative behavior, the outside actor 
bears the primary cost, whereas if the members of Congress choose to assist, they might 
be able to reap a healthy reward without the cost of having to discover the issues.
In addition, Scher (1963) identified congressional preference for activities that 
could have the greatest rewards. If oversight were able to bring rewards to their 
constituencies, they would be more apt to participate in it. It is in the best interest of those 
in the oversight process to receive clear, uncomplicated information, so they are best able 
to act in accordance. Legislators still might not participate in the oversight process even 
when problems are found unless there are clear answers. Without knowing potential 
outcomes, the members of Congress could be putting themselves in the way of 
unnecessary conflict. Rosenthal (1981) mentions that bringing problems to the attention 
of congressmen still might not be enough for them to address the issue because they 
receive enough problems without having to search for any new issues. The fire alarm 
model also accounts for this behavior because it suggests that members of Congress will 
search out those “fires” that can reap the most benefit for their constituent base.
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L im ita tions o f  P o lice  P a tro l an d  F ire A larm  v iew  o f  O versigh t 
The police patrol and fire alarm model of oversight are not completely without 
criticism. Ogul and Rockman (1990) further define the police patrol and fire matrix into a
matrix of active and passive oversight. They create a modified version of police patrol 
which they view, like fire alarm, are decentralized as seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Ogul and Rockman: A Matrix of Oversight Forms___________________
Active Reactive
Police Patrol as described by Response to ‘scandal,’
Centralized McCubbins and Swartz usually through special select
(1984) committee
Police Patrol as modified by Fire Alarm as described by
Decentralized Ogul and Rockman McCubbins and Swartz 
(1984)
Source: Ogul and Rockman (1990, p. 14), Table 1
McCubbins and Swartz’s (1984) original definition place police patrol oversight as 
“comparatively centralized” (p. 166) whereas Ogul and Rockman (1990) believe that 
police patrol oversight is decentralized because congress does not contain a “central 
headquarters” and that these decentralized units often cross over the jurisdictions of other 
committees, but sometimes are able to cooperate and work with other units.
Summary
The policy process, from agenda setting to the evaluation of implemented policies is 
a complex and arduous journey. However, many (if not all steps) are intertwined and 
have an effect on other steps throughout the policy life cycle. Punctuations in policy can 
be created by increases in public attention, which cause positive feedback. During these 
windows of positive feedback, policy creators and individuals willing to take a risk are 
sometimes afforded the opportunity to make large (and sometimes very important) shifts 
in policy.
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Scholars have noted an increase in overall oversight by congressional committees in 
the past 40 years (Smith K. W., 2005), and higher education oversight is not aberrant, 
although it appears to have peaked in the 1980s (Lane & Lefor, 2007). The works by 
McCubbins and Swartz (1984) might play a role in the policy world by helping identify 
the times in which congressional attention is increasing. Looking at the committee 
oversight hearings through the model of fire alarms and police patrols can provide insight 
into the higher education policy process. With members of Congress preferring to 
respond to “fire alarms” within higher education, is there a change in the relationship 





The purpose of this study is to examine changes of congressional oversight 
overtime, specifically fire alarm oversight, and the extent of its relationship to public 
attention. Following in context with the purpose of study, which is to investigate the 
relationship between congressional oversight and attention during separate punctuations 
in the policy process, two questions were asked:
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in New York Times 
higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire alarm 
oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in Congressional 
Quarterly higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire 
alarm oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
Framework of Study
Two major articles serve as the basis for this study. McCubbins and Swartz’s 
“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms” (1984) which 
created an oversight model based on centralized active and direct oversight (police 
patrols) and less centralized and active oversight (fire alarms). The second major article 
used as a base for this study is Balia and Deering’s “Oversight over Time and Across
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Committees: An Operational Measure of Police Patrols and Fire Alarms” which included 
a classification system for the coding of police patrols and fire alarm committee hearings.
McCubbins and Schwartz two-part classification of congressional hearings is based 
on police patrols and fire alarm oversight. Police patrols, they note, are very similar to 
actual police patrol work. By having a strong, centralized control, police are able to deter 
issues from occurring and remedy any problems quickly that may exist. Similarly, when 
Congress uses the committee hearing as a police patrol they are investigating if there are 
any problems that need attention and by showing their interest in oversight, deterring 
future problems. In contrast to police patrols are fire alarms, which are event driven. Fire 
alarms are hearings that come to the attention of legislators by the event itself, public 
attention, lobbyists, and interest groups. Instead of having Congress go out and locate a 
problem, they wait until an outside constituency brings the problem to them so that they 
can address it (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).
The methodology section will be divided into two separate discussions. The first 
section of the methodology will focus on New York Times and its relation to fire alarm 
committee hearing days. The second section of the methodology will focus around the 
Congressional focused newspapers, Congressional Quarterly (an affiliate of the Times 
Publishing Co.) and its relation to the amount of days that fire alarm oversight is 
conducted in each year.
Variables
In order to find a relationship between public attention and fire alarms, first finding 
a way to measure public attention is necessary. Two separate measures to of public 
exposure to see if a relationship can be found -  New York Times articles and
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Congressional Quarterly articles have been chosen. In addition, we must find which 
congressional committee hearings are fire alarms and which are classified as police 
patrols.
Four separate pieces of data are used as the primary sources of information for this 
analysis. First, a dataset of 558 Congressional Committee hearings from 1946 through 
20044 was compiled containing all higher education hearings held by any congressional 
committee in either the House of Representative or the Senate. Second, a dataset of 800 
New York Times articles was compiled for the years of 1946 through 2004 that contained 
a higher education focus. Third, a dataset of higher education articles by Congressional 
Quarterly from 1948 through 2003. The fourth and final dataset is the 500 most 
influential laws compiled by the Policy Agenda’s Project. I will explain the composition 
of each dataset in more detail later in this chapter.
The Policy Agendas Project compiled a collection of all Congressional committee 
hearings. This list of hearings contains over 60,000 Congressional hearings that have 
occurred over the last 70 years. Within this extensive list of hearings, higher education 
hearings were separated using guidelines created by Baumgartner and Jones.5 There were 
558 hearings in higher education from January 1946 until July 2004 (with seven
4 This dataset was compiled in cooperation with Dr. Jason E. Lane, University of Albany
5 Baumgartner and Jones have already separated out the High Education Hearings. Higher Education was 
coded as Topic Code #601. Examples: student loan reform, reauthorization of the higher education act, 
higher education student financial aid programs, violations of NCAA regulations by some colleges, direct 
loan programs for graduate students, student loan fraud and default, role and financial need of black 
colleges and universities, Montgomery GI bill, military education, veterans education assistance, foreign 
students at U.S. military academies, rising costs of operating higher education institutions, improving the 
quality of higher education, Pell Grant eligibility changes, status of university endowments in light of 
federal aid reduction to higher education, national defense education act, Sea Grant and Space Grant 
programs (http://www.policyagendas.0rg/codebooks/topicindex.html#6)
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unpublished6 and one incorrect SuDOC# not used in the dataset.) Once the list of the 558 
hearings was identified, we needed to figure out if the congressional committee was 
considered a “police patrol” hearing or a “fire alarm” hearing.
This study will focus specifically on the “fire alarm” versions of congressional 
hearings. Fire alarms are reactive and generally are preferred by members of Congress 
because they tend to receive widespread media attention and the “cost” of discovery is 
bom by the public who discovers it. Since Congress has a finite amount of time per 
session, they must choose which issues to focus their attention on. Fire alarms tend to 
receive more Congressional attention because once public attention is captured, the 
member of Congress is able to show the public how they are helping the issue and thus 
hoping to secure more votes come election day (Smith, 2003).
The 1970 amendments to the Legislative Reconstruction Act of 1946 increased 
power of the Congressional Research Service to expand their involvement and the 
information they could gather. The increased funding and power to gather information in 
1970 caused a change in the way that congressional hearings were coded post 1970. For 
this reason, the datasets for Congressional hearings had to be coded in two sets, pre-1970 
and post-1970, and combined after coding. Due to increased funding of the Congressional 
Research Service post-1970, a greater amount of information was available about 
Congressional Hearings after 1970, allowing me to align pre-1970 and post-1970 with no 
data lost in the transition.
6 According to policyagendas.org, “Many congressional hearings were not available for public record when 
the Congressional Information Service (CIS) initially began compiling hearing transcripts for publication 
due to the following reasons: hearings were held in executive sessions (this includes most committee 
business meetings and Senate nomination hearings); hearings dealt with investigations involving matters of 
individual privacy; hearings involved matters of national security; or hearings were simply were not 
released at the discretion committee chairs.”
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Congressional hearings before 1970 were located manually by using LexisNexis 
Congressional for the location of the SuDOC numbers. By referencing the CIS Source 
code, we were able to locate the SuDOC number allowing us to find the published 
hearings. Seven of the congressional hearings were not published; all of them occurred 
between the years 1947-1970. In order to code each of the hearings that were published, 
the first six pages of the transcript were printed out. During the start of each hearing, the 
Chairperson would make comments on the reason for the hearings along with who would 
be witness. Under most conditions, the Chairman’s notes were sufficient to explain the 
purpose of the hearing and to determine if the hearing was a police patrol or fire alarm. If 
the lack of information from the Chairman’s notes made it difficult to discern the nature 
of the hearing, the next ten pages were printed.
In order to ensure a more accurate coding process and to reduce coder bias, two 
separate individuals coded the hearings and then discussed any differences in coding 
following the guidelines of Balia and Deering (2004). There were four hearings from 
1949 until 1969 that were initially coded differently, but any discrepancies in what type 
of hearing each was became solved during further discussion of the hearing.
Congressional hearings from 1970 through 2004 were retrieved using the 
Congressional Information Service Abstracts. Once again, hearings were referenced 
according to the Policy Agenda's dataset of Congressional Hearings to separate out the 
higher education hearings. In order to ensure accuracy of coding, two separate individuals 
once again coded the information and then cross-referenced their coding. If differences in 
the two codes were discovered, the Congressional hearing was located and the first six 
pages (containing the Chairmen’s comments) of the hearing were analyzed.
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In order to ensure that the data from the Congressional Information Abstracts was 
accurate, a random sample of 10% of the Congressional hearings from 1970 to 2004 was 
taken using Excel Random Number generator. Through the utilization of the Excel 
Random Number generator, 43 hearings were selected for further investigation to ensure 
accuracy of coding.
After retrieving the full-text hearings for the 43 randomly selected hearings, both 
researchers then individually coded the full-text of the hearing same as before. After 
completion of coding the random sample, there was only one agreed upon difference 
between the full text random sample and the original CIS Abstracts (1 out of 43 hearings, 
-97.65% agreement). From 1970 until 2004, only 12 hearings were originally coded 
differently out of the 426. After retrieving the first eight full text pages of the hearings, 
the discrepancies between the two coders were resolved and one type of hearing was 
selected (fire alarm or police patrol).
As stated previously, two separate coders were used to code each of the hearings 
using guidelines created by Balia and Deering (2001). These guidelines explained six 
situations in which a congressional hearing would be classified as a fire alarm. If the 
hearing did not meet at least one of the six requirements, the hearing was to be 
considered a police patrol. Balia and Deering (p. 13)), using guidance from McCubbins 
and Swartz (1984) explained the guidelines as such:
1) Hearings tied to a specific event are considered responses to fire alarms. 
[Campus unrest during 1969 and the possibility of those who participated 
in the riot losing federal financial aid]
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2) If an event appears to have induced the hearing it should have occurred 
within a year of the hearing itself. [A hearing in relation to the Kent State 
shooting in the 1990’s would not be considered a fire alarm. However, had 
a hearing occurred within a year of May 1970, it would be]
3) Fire alarm hearings are induced by specific rather than general 
problems. [A problem with the collection of student loans would not be 
fire alarm, however if the hearing was focused on specifically on a sharp 
increase of students defaulting on the Stafford loan it could be]
4) Hearings that respond to specific Supreme Court cases, provided they 
have been decided in the past year, are considered responses to fire alarms. 
Distant cases or more general reviews of Court actions, however, are not 
[Gratz v Bollinger in 2003 is a specific case, however if a hearing was 
conducted in 2006 it would not be considered a fire alarm]
5) Hearings that consider routine or mandated reports [The President’s 
state of the Union that states a new higher education initiative would not 
be considered a fire alarm, however if the Secretary of Education 
announces a dramatic change in federal funding that could be considered a 
fire alarm]
6) Witnesses who were specifically called to task or who presented 
specific grievances were also used as indicators of fire alarm hearings. [If 
the President of University was called to be a witness to speak of their 
campus’s failing infrastructure]
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The first instrument to measure public attention is the use of the New York Times 
article database. The complete New York Times dataset was downloaded from the Policy 
Agenda website. This dataset is a random sample of all New York Times articles for each 
year, compiled from 1946 until 2003. This data, coded by major themes7, allowed the 
researcher to separate the original dataset of 44,331 New York Times articles down to 
1,652 records that were coded with the main theme of “education.” This education 
subgroup contained articles that included all levels of education from pre-school to 
doctoral programs.
Major keywords were chosen from the titles in order to identify which of the 
articles were related to higher education. The keywords chosen to identify higher 
education related articles were “Veterans”, “College”, “University”, “Dean”, “Professor”, 
“Doctor”, “Loans”, “Grants”, and “Degree”, and “Higher”. In order to ensure that the 
abbreviations that were used during the policyagenda.com coding were accounted for 
keywords were searched for using both full word and abbreviations, (ex. College and 
Coll, University and Univ) After the keywords were found within the titles, each was 
verified to contain the relevant information (example: Doctor, as in doctoral candidate or 
doctor at a university -  not a doctor at a veterinary clinic.) Since abbreviations could also 
increase the risk of including irrelevant words in the search each time a word was found 
within a title it was verified to be an accurate abbreviation and not an irrelevant section of 
a word (ex. the abbreviation “prof’ used in the context as a professor of higher education 
and not as a part of the word professionalism.)
7 There are major 27 topic codes. Each article is coded by topic area and checked by at least three coders to 
ensure consistency and correspondence with the congressional hearings, statutes, and CQ stories datasets of 
the Policy Agendas Project
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After the articles were key-worded, 976 articles remained that did not contain any 
of the keywords listed above. These article titles were read through one-by-one in order 
to find any relevant higher education related articles that were not identified by the 
keywords. From the 976 articles that did not contain any of the previously stated higher 
education keywords another 113 were found to be higher education related. The majority 
of the articles not found in the keyword search were related to specific institutions of 
higher education (such as Ohio U. or Columbia U.) which would not have been identified 
using a keyword search because of the specificity regarding the institution name or the 
use of “U” as an abbreviation for “university.” From the New Yorks Times sample set of 
44,331 articles published, 800 articles were found to be related to higher education.
The second instrument to measure the amount of public attention devoted to higher 
education is the use of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac article database. The 
complete dataset was downloaded from the Policy Agenda website and contained a 
complete listing of all articles covered in the main chapters of the Almanac from 1948 
until 2003. The Congressional Quarterly dataset should contain a different view of higher 
education attention because it contains information on bills and legislation inside of
o  .  Qcongress . This data, coded by major themes , allowed the researcher to separate the 
original dataset of 13,501 Congressional Quarterly articles down to 128 records that were 
coded with the theme of “higher education.” Since the data was already sorted by sub- 89
8 CQ includes articles about bills that became law, many that did not become law, and some items not 
explicitly legislative in nature. A case is an article or-in rare instances-a portion of an article. CQ Almanac 
articles typically cover one legislative initiative. When a CQ article contains information about several 
different statutes or bills, articles are divided so that each record contains information about one legislative 
initiative. The articles vary in size and depth of description.
9 There are major 27 topic codes. Each article is coded by topic area and checked by at least three coders to 
ensure consistency and correspondence with the congressional hearings, statutes, and CQ stories datasets of 
the Policy Agendas Project
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themes (higher education), the experimenter did not have to go through each article in 
order to separate the articles from the main theme of education.
The third dataset used for this experiment is a compilation of the 500 most 
important laws of the form 1948 through 2005. This list, actually containing 576 laws 
over the course of 57 years ranks each pieces of legislation by the amount of line of 
coverage in Congressional Quarterly. The Higher Education Act of 1965 had 1,560 lines 
of coverage and the 1980 authorization of funds for the Department of Education 
received 495 lines of coverage.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics and frequencies for each factor were run and analyzed for the 
entire population of congressional hearings, New York Times articles, Congressional 
Quarterly articles and the results were analyzed. A regression model was then run, but 
due to the low occurrences over time, was found to be an inadequate model for this study. 
For that reason, a Poisson regression model was used to determine any relationship 
between the amount of days of fire alarm oversight and the New York Times and 
Congressional Quarterly articles.
When running the Poisson regression, days of fire alarms per year was treated as the 
dependent variable with days of police patrol hearings acting as the baseline amount of 
activity per year. Since police patrols, by definition, tend to be a reauthorizations required 
by legislation and also contain hearings that are considered routine or induced by a broad 
problem, they will serve as a baseline for the amount of hearings that would occur if no 
specific “fire alarm” oversight had occurred.
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There were six independent variables (as seen in Table 3) used for this study are nytlag, 
nylag2, cqlag, cqlag2, year65_80 and year80up. First, nytlag and nytlag2 are the amount 
of New York Times articles in the year prior, and two years prior to the test year. Second, 
cqlag and cqlag2 are the amount of Congressional Quarterly articles one and two years 
prior to the test year. Both New York Times articles and Congressional Quarterly articles 
were lagged by either one or two years to see if there is a difference in the amount of time 
that is required for information to be disseminated to the mass to then cause a fire alarm 
hearing. The independent variables were lagged in this study to allow one the possibility 
to find a cause-and-effect relationship between lagged independent variables and the 
dependant variable.
Table 3: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
FireAlarms Days of Fire alarm hearings per year as defined by McCubbins and Swartz (1984) by using the guidelines from Balia and Deering (2001)
PolicePatrols
Days of Police Patrol hearings per year as defined by McCubbins and 
Swartz (1984) by using the guidelines from Balia and Deering (2001). 
This is used as a baseline of congressional hearing activity per year
nytlag
New York times articles per year, lagged (New York Times articles 
from the prior year were compared to Fire Alarm Days of current year) 
one year
nylag2
New York times articles per year, lagged (New York Times articles 
from the two years prior were compared to Fire Alarm Days of current 
year) two years
cqlag
Congressional Quarterly almanac articles per year, lagged 
(Congressional Quarterly almanac articles from the prior year were 
compared to Fire Alarm Days of current year) one year
cqlag2
Congressional Quarterly almanac articles per year, lagged 
(Congressional Quarterly almanac articles from the two years prior were 
compared to Fire Alarm Days of current year) two years
year65_80
A user created dummy variable; placing “0” in the years 1946 through 
1964 and 1980 through 2004. The years 1965 through 1979 contain a
66  J  99
year80up
A user created dummy variable; placing “0” in the years 1946 through 
1964 and 1965 through 1979. The years 1980 through 2004 contain a
66  ^  99
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The last two independent variables for this study are year65_80 and year80up. These 
variables take into account the punctuation periods in comparison to the base period of 
1944 through 1964. By applying these variables to the regression we are able to see if the 
amount of New York Times or Congressional Quarterly articles required to trigger a fire 
alarm hearing (if found that a significant relationship occurs) increases or decreases 
between each of the three periods.
Summary
Coding of the Congressional hearings into either a police patrol or fire alarm 
hearing following the guidelines of Balia & Deering (2001) allows one to view the shift 
of hearing type through each year from 1946 until 2004. Through the use of the Policy 
Agenda Projects databases, data have been compiled on higher education Congressional 
Hearings, New York Times articles, Congressional Quarterly articles and the 500 most 
important laws, (as identified by the Policy Agenda Project).
The Congressional hearings dataset yeilded 558 higher education hearings of 
which 446 hearings were coded as police patrols with the other 102 coded as fire alarm 
oversight hearings. The original New York Times dataset contained 44,331 articles that 
are a sample of all the New York Times articles published each year. From the sample 
set, 800 articles were found to be related to higher education. The third variable, 
Congressional Quarterly articles, came from a dataset containing all 13,501 articles 
published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac each year. Of the 13,501 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles, 128 articles were coded with the theme of 
higher education by the Policy Agenda Project. The last variable used in this study is the 
500 most important laws. The frequency of Congressional Quarterly covereage (judged
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by lines of coverage) was used to decide the most important laws since 1946. The Higher 
Education Act along with the 1980 Budget approval for the Department of Education as it 
transitioned to a cabinet level agency served as the two punctuation periods that seperated 
each of the three policy periods.
The initial analysis of the Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis resulted in a 
non linear distribution which lead to the use of a Poisson regression analysis. Each of 
these varibles was then inserted into a Possion regression to determine if a relationship 
exists between each media type and the amount of fire alarm hearing days per year. The 
independent variables were lagged by both one and two years in order to allow the 
regressional analysis to show causality. In addition, dummy variables were constructed 




The purpose of this study is to examine changes of congressional oversight 
overtime, specifically fire alarm oversight, and the extent of its relationship to public 
attention. Following in context with the purpose of study, which is to investigate the 
relationship between congressional oversight and attention during separate punctuations 
in the policy process, two questions were asked:
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in New York Times 
higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire alarm 
oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
• What effect, if any, does external attention (measured in Congressional 
Quarterly higher education articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire 
alarm oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?
This chapter includes a description of the population and samples used along with 
graphical representations and the statistical formula used for this study. Analysis of data 
and results of statistical tests addressing each of the research questions are included. For 
the purposes of this study a 0.05 level of statistical significance is set.
Description of Data Set
Data for each of the three independent variables was collected and analyzed to 
measure the influence on the dependant variable, number of fire alarms. Of the 557
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Figure 2: Amount of Police Patrol and Fire Alarm Oversight Hearings Per Year
were classified as police patrols (80.1%), 102 of the hearings were fire alarms (18.3%), 
with nine hearings remaining not able to be coded 10( 1 .6 %).
The data presented in Figure 2 shows that from 1946 until 1969, the number of Fire 
Alarm hearings remained relatively constant, staying lower than four oversight hearings 
per year. In 1969 there were four congressional hearings related to higher education; that 
increased to six in 1973. The years from 1969 until 1991 was a time of increased fire 
alarm oversight, which returned to low numbers of fire alarm hearings (less than 3 per 
year) in 1992. Fire alarm oversight reached a maximum of seven oversight hearings in 
1990, decreasing again to zero in 1994.
Police Patrol oversight also has some fluctuations throughout the data set. From 
1946 until 1985 an increase in police patrol oversight occurred, starting at 1 hearing per 
year in 1946 and increasing steadily until 24 in 1983 and 23 in 1985. However, major 
fluctuations in police patrols hearing would now accompany reauthorizations of the
10 Eight hearings between 1946 and 1970 were unpublished, with another hearing in 1946 with an incorrect 
SuDOC number for retrieval.
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Higher Education Act of 1965 which can be seen in 1991 and 1997, both of which are 
one year prior to the reauthorization.
The number of days that each hearing lasts was used as an indicator of how 
“important” a congressional committee hearing was. It is important to note that I am not 
looking to define “importance” as how much the hearing will further higher education 
(for example, reauthorization may be very important when they are required by law), but 
rather to account for increased publicity, amount of witnesses testimony, and volume of 
information that can be gathered in a greater length hearing. By adding the amount of 
days that each hearing lasted together, one is able to see a weighted amount of fire alarm 
and police patrol hearings.
F ire A larm  H earing  D a ys
Looking specifically at the amount of fire alarm hearing days per year, we can see 
in Figure 3, the first punctuation period (1946 through 1964) shows a relatively stable 
period for fire alarm oversight in terms of hearings per year, with peaks in 1950 and 
1956. Table 4 shows that the maximum number of fire alarm days spend per year was 9 
days in 1950; however, the average amount of fire alarm hearings that occurred per year 
for the 19-year period is only 2 days spent on fire alarm hearings per year.
Table 4: Fire Alarm Hearing Days Per Year
N Min Max Mean
Standard
Deviation Total
Fire Alarm Hearing Days Per Year 
(1946-1964) 19 0 9 2 . 0 0 2.333 38
Fire Alarm Hearing Days Per Year 
(1965-1980) 15 0 19 7.73 7.343 116
Fire Alarm Hearing Days Per Year 
(1980-2004) 25 0 1 1 2 . 1 2 2.421 53
Fire Alarm Hearing Days Per Year 
(1946-2004) 59 0 19 3.51 4.829 207
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Figure 3: Fire Alarm Oversight Days and Hearings Per Year
In the second period, a marked increase in the amount of fire alarm hearings occurs 
first in 1969 and repeats itself in 1974 and 1975. These increases in oversight hearing 
days raise the second period average of fire alarm hearings to over 7.3 compared to 2.0 in 
the first period. In addition, weighting the amount of fire alarms per year by the length of 
the hearings reveals the differences between fire alarm hearings and fire alarm days. The 
black vertical lines appear when the amount of days exceeds the amount of hearings. The 
amount of days conducting fire alarm hearings per year will always be greater than the 
amount of hearings because each of the hearings (either police patrol or fire alarm) lasted 
at least part of one day.
The third punctuation area returns to a period of relative stability with an 11-day 
hearing range and a mean of fire alarm hearing days per year of 2.12. Similar to period 1, 
period 3 has only one large deviation in 1990 with 11 hearing days that year. A decrease 
of oversight hearing days per year occurs from the high of 19 in 1975 dropping to a low 
of zero fire alarm hearings in 1986 for the first time in 14 years.
Due to the nature of a the police patrol hearing (legislative surveillance, 
reauthorizations, field observations, etc) this study will use the amount of Police Patrol 
hearing days per year as a control for the baseline amount of Congressional attention to 
higher education per year.
Figure 4 shows the amount of police patrol oversight in days per year. Similar to 
fire alarms, oversight, measured in both days and actual amount of occurrences did not 
occur very often per year throughout the first period. Although the actual number of 
police patrol hearings never surpassed six hearings per year, 1951 saw an 18 day field 
hearing on veterans’ educational programs. Twenty-one days of police patrol hearings
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Table 5: Police Patrol Hearing Days Per Year




Police Patrol Hearing Days Per Year 
(1946-1964) 19 0 2 1 6.89 6.226 131
Police Patrol Hearing Days Per Year 
(1965-1980) 15 7 56 29.73 17.629 446
Police Patrol Hearing Days Per Year 
(1980-2004) 25 2 80 14.40 17.342 360
Police Patrol Hearing Days Per Year 
(1946-2004) 59 0 80 15.88 16.986 937
would not be seen again for another 14 years when in 1965 forty days of hearings were 
held.
The second period, from 1965-1980 showed greater fluctuation then period one did 
with a mean amount of days of police patrol hearings increasing from an average of 6.89 
to an average of 29.73 hearing days per year. Another interesting characteristic of the 
second time period is that a larger disconnect between the amount of hearings and the 
amount of days that each of the hearing lasted. Although it appears in Figure 2 that the 
amount of oversight peaks in the mid 1980s, more days were actually spent on oversight 
of higher education in the late 1960s and mid 1970s.
The third punctuation period starts a new pattern for police patrol oversight as seen 
in Table 5. With the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the 1980 elevation 
of the Department of Education higher education oversight becomes more cyclical 
(becoming very pronounced in 1990-1992). The reauthorizations of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 are now creating large increases of police patrol oversight in the year prior to 
the authorization. In addition, hearings are becoming shorter in length with each police 
patrol hearing between 1992 and 2003 lasting only one day in length. Similar to fire 
alarm oversight days, police patrol days also increase in the 3rd period, although
Figure 4: Police Patrol Oversight Days and Hearings Per Year
Police Patrol Oversight Days and Hearings Per Year
not as low as they were in the first period with a second period average of 29.73 to a third 
period average of 14.40 days per year.
N ew  York Tim es a n d  C on gression al Q u arterly  A lm anac A rtic les  
Having defined our dependant variable (fire alarms) and control variable (police 
patrols) it is valuable to understand the dynamics of the New York Times articles sample 
set. The New York Times dataset has a range of 16 articles per year, with 1958 and 1963 
having a low of 8  and 1947 having a high of 24 higher education articles published per 
year.
Similar to the fire alarm days and police patrol days, Figure 5 shows an increase in 
the amount of articles relating to higher education in the second period of activity with a 
peak of 38 in 1970. In period three, a decrease of New York Times articles occurs to a 
low of four in 1980. Table 6  shows that although the second period only has 15 years 
(25.4% of the years in the sample) over 38% of the New York Times articles were 
published during that time frame.
Table 6 : New York Times Articles Per Year




New York Times Articles Per Year 
(1946-1964) 19 8 24 14.74 4.280 280
New York Times Articles Per Year 
(1965-1980) 15 8 38 20.67 7.556 310
New York Times Articles Per Year 
(1980-2004) 25 4 17 8.36 3.707 209
New York Times Articles Per Year 
(1946-2004) 59 4 38 13.54 7.094 799
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Figure 5: Number of Articles Published Each Year in the New York Times Sample Set
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The second independent variable used in the study is the amount of Congressional 
Quarterly articles that are published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 
Congressional Quarterly articles are important for consideration because these articles 
often contain information on legislation and hearings that did not become law. Unlike 
New York Times Articles, Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education 
occurred less frequently and with a smaller range. Whereas there were never fewer than 
four New York Times articles per year, zero Congressional Quarterly articles related to 
higher education were published seven of the 59 years. Table 7 shows the descriptive 
statistics for Congressional Quarterly articles.






Congressional Quarterly Articles 
Per Year (1946-1964) 16 0 8 2.19 2.316 35
Congressional Quarterly Articles 
Per Year (1965-1980) 15 0 7 2.87 2.066 43
Congressional Quarterly Articles 
Per Year (1980-2004) 2 1 0 5 2.38 1.532 50
Congressional Quarterly Articles 
Per Year (1946-2004) 52 0 8 2.46 1.935 128
Overall, fewer Congressional Quarterly Articles (average of 2.46 articles per year) 
that focused on higher education appeared than to New York Times articles (average of 
13.54 articles per year). However, unlike Fire Alarm Days, Police Patrol Days and New 
York Times articles, there was not a major increase in the second period as seen in the 
other three variables. In the first period, Congressional Quarterly articles remained 
relatively low (average of 2.19 articles) even though it did have the largest range (8 ) of 
all three periods. Table 7 shows the third period, from 1980 until 2000 contained the most
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Congressional Quarterly articles, but lagged behind the second period for most articles 
per year on with an average of 2.38 and 2.87, respectfully.
Figure 6  displays the amount of Congressional Quarterly articles and the amount of 
Fire alarm days per year. Unlike New York Times articles, which occurred more 
frequently from 1967 through 1979, Congressional Quarterly articles remained relatively 
constant with only a small spike (increase of 4) in 1970.
Poisson Regression Analysis
The analysis consisted of regression models on the two independent variables: New 
York Times Articles, Congressional Quarterly Articles that contained information of or 
related to higher education. In addition, as a baseline level of attention for higher 
education in Congress police patrols will be used. Originally, a simple regression was 
going to be used to analyze the data, but due to such infrequent occurrences of New York 
Times articles, Congressional Quarterly Articles and Fire Alarm Days a Poisson 
regression was used because it is more robust on small population or samples.
Two important factors must be understood when dealing with the Poisson 
regression. First, coefficient values are not direct translations into magnitude. For 
example, if a coefficient of a variable is 2 . 0  (at a significant level) it does not mean that 
there are two times as many occurrences of data within that period. The Poisson 
regression uses the first period as a baseline activity and through the use of the dummy 
variables compares the next two periods (if statistically significant) to the first.
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Figure 6: Number of Articles Published Each Year in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac
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The formula for both the New York Times Articles and Congressional Quarterly 
articles in function form is:
Fire Alarms = f(PolicePatrols, NYT articles, Time period) and 
Fire Alarms = f(PolicePatrols, CQ articles, Time period), or more specifically 
Fire alarms = Po + PiXj + P2 X2 + P3 X3 + P4 X4  + P5 X5 + error, 
whereas we derive two following equations:
1) Fire Alarms = Po+ PiPolice Patrols + p2NYTLagi + p3 NYTLag2 + P4Years65 go
+ p5Year8ouP + error
2) Fire Alarms = Po+ PiPolice Patrols + P2 CQLag! + p3 CQLag2 + P4Years65_so
+ p5 Year8oup + error
In accordance to regression model standards, we are testing to see if the amount 
of New York Times articles to the amount of fire alarm days in a given year, the New 
York Times data was lagged both one and two years. Lagging the independent variables 
allow one to test if there would be a difference in the length of time between the New 
York Times articles and the amount of fire alarm days per year.
For one to test the magnitude change from period 1, to period 2, to period 3 ,1 
have inserted two dummy variables into the equation. By allowing the dummy variables 
to interact with the full regression, it will allow one to see if the relationship between the 
amount of New York Times articles and fire alarm days changes through each period. 
Results for the Poisson regression are displayed in Table 8  and show a significant 
relationship at a=0.05 for the overall New York Times articles, along with the 
Years65_80 (dummy variable 1) and Year80up (dummy variable 2).
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Research Question
A Poisson regression was first completed for New York Times articles by each of 
the three periods. In following with the thesis question, “What effect, if any, does 
external attention (measured in New York Times higher education articles) have on the 
amount or occurrence of fire alarm oversight conducted by Congressional Committees?” 
the experimenter is able to see that a significant relationship does occur between New 
York Times articles per year (lagged) and each period of Fire Alarm Days.
Table 8  shows that New York Times articles lagged one year has a significant (0.000 at 
an a=0.05), positive (.04 coefficient) with the amount of fire alarm days (pseudo r=26%). 
In addition, when the second period is compared to the first level, it is again positive, 
however it is also stronger. The third period is also statistically significant and has a 
larger coefficient then period one; however, it does not have as large of a coefficient as 
the period two does.
Table 8 : Poisson Regression Results for New York Times Articles
Fire Alarm Days 
Overall 
(1946-2004)
Fire Alarm Days 
1965-1979
Fire Alarm Days 
1980-2004
New York Times Articles .04 1.535 0.544
Lagged 1 Year (.0 0 0 )* (.0 0 0 )* (.029)*
New York Times Articles -0.005
Lagged 2 Years (0.694)
*Significant at 0.05
Table 9 shows that Congressional Quarterly articles lagged one year has an 
insignificant (0.575 at an a=0.05) relationship with the amount of fire alarm days that 
occur each year. However, it is important to note that in period two, a significant 
relationship was found. Period three, similar to period one was not found to have a
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significant relationship between Congressional Quarterly articles per year and the amount 
of fire alarm days per year.
Table 9: Poisson Regression Results for Congressional Quarterly Almanac Articles
Fire Alarm Days 
1946-2004
Fire Alarm Days 
1965-1979
Fire Alarm Days 
1980-2004
Congressional Quarterly 
Articles Lagged 1 Year
0 . 0 0 1
(.961)
1.807




Articles Lagged 2 Years





SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Summary
The goal of this project was to see if a relationship existed and if there was 
fluctuation between congressional oversight and attention between significant 
punctuations in the policy process. By using datasets comprised of New York Times 
articles and Congressional Quarterly articles, we were able to measure the amount of 
exposure that external constituencies received in the field of higher education. After 
coding all available Congressional Committee hearings using a model created by 
McCubbins and Swartz (1984) and coding guidelines by Balia and Deering (2001), I am 
able to determine which hearings are fire alarms (external, event driven) and which 
hearings are police patrols (reauthorizations of prior legislation, etc.)
After finding two major punctuation events, one is able to break up the 58-year 
period into three separate periods. The first period, 1946 through 1964, showed an 
increase in overall amounts of oversight, albeit marginal (an increase of one in the 
average amount of hearings per year every seven years.) The second period, however, 
gave an incredibility different view of higher education oversight with increasing 
amounts of oversight (an increase of one in the average amount of hearings per year 
every 1.5 years.) With increased racial tensions and campus unrest at Universities11 to
11 See, CIS Source: 91-H2451-4, 91-H2464-1
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increased problems with financial aid and loan fraud12, higher education oversight 
increased dramatically in during 1965 through 1980. The third period again showed a 
dramatic change from the first period of slow, but steady increases in oversight. After the 
passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965, oversight tends to be centered on 
reauthorization periods starting after 1980. Dramatic increases in oversight a year prior to 
the reauthorizations are followed with minimal oversight of higher education once the 
reauthorizations are completed.
Conclusion
R esearch Q uestion O ne -  N ew  York Tim es A rtic les  
The first research question to be addressed in this study is: What effect, if any, 
does external attention (measured in New York Times higher education articles) have on 
the amount or occurrence of fire alarm oversight conducted by Congressional 
Committees?
In order to determine how long New York Times articles needed to be lagged, we 
ran a Poisson regression with the articles lagged both one and two years. Independent 
variables are lagged in this model because we are attempting to test if there is a 
relationship on days of fire alarm oversight compared to the amount of New York Times 
articles. In this model, it is assuming that the New York Times articles should appear 
first, and then cause an increase in attention of higher education, thus increasing fire 
alarm oversight of higher education. Analysis shows that New York Times articles 
lagged one period does have a statistically significant relationship with days of fire alarm 
oversight, however, New York Times articles lagged two years have lost their
12 See, CIS Source: 73-S541-52, 74-H341-23, 75-H341-24, 75-H341-17
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significance. I believe that this could be explained because of the increased amount of 
time between the newsworthy event and the time of the hearings.
First, Hypothesis 1 a is that a significant relationship exists between the amount of 
New York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the amount of 
days of fire alarms oversight between 1946-2004. After computation of the New York 
Time dataset, the Poisson regression showed that Hypothesis la is correct. When taking 
into context the overall relationship between fire alarms and New York Times articles I 
was able to find a statistically significant relationship (p=0.00 at a=0.05) with a very 
small coefficient of 0.04.
Hypothesis lb states a significant relationship exists between the amount of New 
York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the amount of days of 
fire alarms oversight between the second policy period of 1965-1979. This hypothesis 
was also supported with a statistically significant relationship (p=0.00 at a=0.05) and a 
stronger coefficient of 1.535.
The third Hypothesis, lc states that a significant relationship exists between the 
amount of New York Times articles related to higher education and an increase in the 
amount of days of fire alarms oversight between the second policy period of 1980-2004. 
Analysis found that hypothesis three is also supported with a statistically significant 
relationship (p=0.29 at a=0.05) and a coefficient of 0.544.
While the actual coefficient is not important for this study, what is important is 
that the relationship is statistically significant and that the coefficient is positive. The 
reason that I will be not be interpreting the actual coefficient is because although it shows 
a relationship between this study’s measure of external attention, the actual translation is
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of the coefficient is less important than knowing the significant, direction and magnitude 
of the coefficient. For example, if the coefficient of New York Times articles (lagged one 
year) to Fire Alarm Days is 1.5, it is not important that an increase in a specific amount of 
New York Times articles will yield an increase in one fire alarm day. Flowever, the 
coefficient is very important when comparing period one and period three because it 
shows that in period two a smaller increase in attention is needed to yield one more fire 
alarm oversight hearing day.
The first research question can be answered by saying that this is a relationship 
between the amount of New York Times Articles per year and the amount of fire alarm 
oversight days per year.
R esearch Q uestion  Tw o -  C on gression a l Q u arterly  A rtic les
Similar to research question one, the second question is addressing: What effect, 
if any, does external attention (measured in Congressional Quarterly higher education 
articles) have on the amount or occurrence of fire alarm oversight conducted by 
Congressional Committees?
Again, in order to determine how long Congressional Quarterly articles needed to 
be lagged, we ran a Poisson regression with the articles lagged both one and two years. In 
this model, it is assuming that the Congressional Quarterly articles should appear first, 
and then an increase in attention of higher education will be found, thus increasing fire 
alarm oversight of higher education. Analysis shows that Congressional Quarterly articles 
lagged one period does not have a statistically significant relationship (p=0.575, a=0.05) 
with days of fire alarm oversight. In addition, Congressional Quarterly articles lagged 
two years also does not have a significant relationship.
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The first hypothesis for question two is 2a stating that a significant relationship 
exists between the amount of Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education 
and an increase in the amount of days of fire alarms oversight between 1946-2004. 
However, after running the data using a Poisson regression I found the hypothesis not be 
supported. There is not a significant (p=0.575, a=0.05) relationship between 
Congressional Quarterly articles and the amount of fire alarm oversight days per year.
The second hypothesis, 2b, states a significant relationship exists between the 
amount of Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education and an increase in 
the amount of days of fire alarms oversight between the second policy period of 1965- 
1979. This hypothesis was statistically significant (p=0.00, a=0.05), however, since it is 
compared to period one (which is insignificant) it loses significance. The coefficient of 
1.545 appears to be similar to the coefficient found in the New York Times dataset in 
Question one. This significance in period two could be caused by several reasons. First, it 
could be a detection of an actual increase of attention during the second period (1965- 
1979), similar to the one seen in Question one, hypothesis b. However, since this variable 
is a dummy variable, it is showing that media attention (with all responses in the second 
period equal to 1 ) shows a significant relationship with the overall variable set, which in 
this case is not statistically significant, voiding the significance of the second period.
The third hypothesis, 2c, states that significant relationship exists between the 
amount of Congressional Quarterly articles related to higher education and an increase in 
the amount of days of fire alarms oversight between the first policy period of 1980-2004. 
This hypothesis was also not supported. No statistically significant relationship (p=0.233,
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a=0.05) was found between the amount of Congressional Quarterly articles and fire alarm 
days in period three.
Discussion
The most important aspect of this thesis, following the direction of the thesis 
question, is there a difference between the punctuation periods and the attention that 
causes fire alarm congressional oversight. Simply, yes, but unfortunately it is not that 
simple. New York Times articles has a statistically significant relationship with fire alarm 
days per year and when comparing them between periods you will notice that it would 
take less New York Times articles per year in the second period than it would in the first 
or third. However, for this study, it is more important to look at each period as a whole, 
then each article per year throughout each period. For example, while one is able to 
calculate how much an increase of one New York Time article would have on the amount 
of fire alarm days per year, we would be missing the bigger picture. Throughout the three 
time periods, it would take less New York Times articles between 1965 and 1979 to gain 
another day of fire alarm hearings, than in the first and third period since the coefficient 
is higher. Without calculating an exact percentage of fire alarm days per increase in New 
York Times articles we are still able interpret the coefficient with great meaning.
In addition, another very important aspect of the analysis is that New York Times 
articles are statistically significant, whereas Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles are 
not. I purpose three main explanations for the incongruence of the significance of the 
relationships between New York Times and Fire Alarm Days and the absence of a 
relationship between Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles and Fire Alarm Days; 
style of printing along with intended audience and circulation size.
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First, the New York Times is a daily newspaper that contains a wide variety of 
topics that appeal to a general audience whereas the Congressional Quarterly Almanac is 
a compilation of Congressional Weekly articles that focuses specifically on legislative 
activity. I feel that a specific focus on legislative activities could create a limit on the 
amount of attention that the average person would give the publication. This could be one 
explanation to the relationship between New York Times articles and fire alarm days, and 
no significant relationship between Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles and fire 
alarm days.
Second, the audience that each of the publications is intended for along with the 
circulation size of the publications may be the reason between the two differing results. 
With the focus of the New York Times not being government specific, a greater cross 
section of our country attention can be reached. With CQ Weekly’s mission “to be the 
publication of record on Congress”, the scope of the audience could be more limited than 
the scope of the country that reads the New York Times. With McCubbins and Swartz’s 
police patrol and fire alarm dichotomy focused on external attention, one could assume 
that the larger external audience (outside of Congress) that pays attention to higher 
education the more informed the public would become, thus increasing the chance that 
fire alarm oversight would occur.
In addition, the New York Times with a circulation of approximately 1,120,420 
daily with over 1,627,062 newspapers on Sunday (approximately 8.5 million per week), it 
has over 600 times the amount of readers per week (2007: Top 100 subscriptions). The 
CQ Weekly publication (which is compiled into the CQ Almanac) has 14,114 weekly 
readers, with the majority of the Congressional members having subscriptions (CQ.com)
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By playing on the work of McCubbins and Swartz (1984) and Balia and Deering 
(2 0 0 1 ), the fire alarm and police patrol dichotomy appears have to have been a successful 
variable when compared to New York Times articles. Since fire alarm by definition is 
externally monitored by interest groups and concern citizens, this appears to be a logical 
connection.
Smith (2005) states that oversight has been increasing since we started tracking 
oversight in 1946 and even though it is often referred to as congress’s neglected function 
(Aberbach, 1990; Ogul M. , 1977) it has made great strides. One finding of this research 
is that during the second period (1965-1979) increases in both fire alarm days and New 
York Times articles lead to a significant relationship between the two and showed that 
during period 2  it would take fewer articles related to higher education to spur one fire 
alarm day. Although I have mentioned it previously, it is important to remember that the 
New York Times sample set is just a measure of one’s exposure to higher education 
policy and thus by increasing articles tenfold that people may become more aware, but 
may not discover any wrongdoing or corruption.
After further review of the audience, circulation, and dynamics of each form of 
publication (New York Times and Congressional Quarterly) it appears as the data is a 
proper fit to the results. However, further research will have to be conducted to discover 
causality and try to remove the spuriousness of the variables that were used in the study. 
By including an increased amount of variables such as majority party in Congress, 
divided House and Senate, and party of the Legislative and Executive branches one might 
be able to further understand other influences on fire alarm oversight days that occur each 
year.
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In summary, the thesis questions have been answered with the data showing that 
there are differences between each punctuation period and the amount of attention when 
related to fire alarm days. The changing structure of both the executive branch 
organizations that create higher education policy along with the changing mechanisms for 
oversight and passage of new laws create a fluid dynamic between the two branches. As 
policies shift, understanding the effect of attention and oversight can be an extremely 
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